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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
We  uncover  a “paradox  of  formal  appropriability  mechanisms”  in  the  case  of  knowledge-intensive
business services  (KIBS)  ﬁrms.  Despite  evidence  that  KIBS  ﬁrms  do not  typically  consider  formal  appro-
priability  mechanisms,  such  as  patents,  to be central  mechanisms  for capturing  value  from  innovation,
we  show  that they  are nevertheless  important  for their innovation  collaboration.  Drawing  on  an  origi-
nal  survey  of  publicly-traded  UK and  US  KIBS  ﬁrms,  we  ﬁnd  a signiﬁcant  positive  association  between
the  importance  of  innovation  collaboration  and  the  importance  of  formal  appropriability  mechanisms.
We  interrogate  the evidence  for clients,  as  they  are  the  most  important  partners  for  innovation  collab-
oration.  We  ﬁnd  that  the  importance  of  innovation  collaboration  with  clients  goes  hand-in-hand  with
the  importance  of  formal  appropriability  mechanisms,  although  a negative  relation  appears  when  ﬁrms
assign  very  high  importance  to  formal  appropriability  mechanisms.  Thus,  modest  levels  of  emphasis  on
formal  appropriability  mechanisms  may  prevent  conﬂicts  over  ownership  of jointly  developed  knowl-
edge  assets  and  knowledge  leakages,  while  also  avoiding  the possibly  negative  effects  of  overly  strict
controls  by legal  departments  on  innovation  collaboration.  As  well  as exploring  formal  appropriabil-
ity  mechanisms,  we  also  investigate  the  relationship  between  contractual  and  strategic  appropriability
mechanisms  and  innovation  collaboration  for  KIBS  ﬁrms.
© 2016  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is  an open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY  license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Collaboration for innovation has long been the norm for ser-
vices ﬁrms (Arundel et al., 2007; Chesbrough, 2011), and especially
for knowledge-intensive business services (KIBS) ﬁrms, which
rely heavily on technical or professional knowledge to solve the
problems of their clients (Miles, 2005). Since KIBS ﬁrms create
knowledge assets regularly and jointly with external partners, they
may  ﬁnd value capture even more challenging than ﬁrms in other
sectors. Continuous search and transfer of knowledge in collabo-
ration with external partners (and especially clients) can expose
KIBS ﬁrms to regular conﬂicts in establishing and enforcing own-
ership over co-produced knowledge assets or preventing leakages
of knowledge.
Evolutionary economics highlights the role of search in enabling
ﬁrms to develop new combinations of knowledge and pursue new
technological paths (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Metcalfe, 1994).
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: marcela.miozzo@mbs.ac.uk (M.  Miozzo).
An important part of search includes access to external knowl-
edge through collaboration with other organisations (Rothwell
et al., 1974; von Hippel, 1976). But there are dangers in sharing
knowledge with external partners: there is scope for uninten-
tional knowledge leakages and, indeed, imitation by competitors
(Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002). Research on ﬁrms in manufac-
turing sectors shows that appropriability mechanisms may be
employed to avoid these unwanted spillovers. Nevertheless, exces-
sive emphasis on appropriability mechanisms may  discourage
potential innovation collaborators, reducing incentives for, the
scope of, or effectiveness of innovation collaboration (Laursen
and Salter, 2014; Liebeskind, 1997). In the particular case of ser-
vices ﬁrms, however, an additional challenge concerns conﬂicts of
ownership over knowledge assets which are regularly and jointly
created with clients. To date, however, few studies of ﬁrms’ choice
of structures (including governance modes and appropriability
mechanisms) to source external knowledge and prevent unwanted
spillovers of knowledge have addressed service ﬁrms.
We draw on an original survey of 153 publicly-traded KIBS ﬁrms
in the UK and the USA. Our paper advances our understanding of
the relation between appropriability mechanisms and collabora-
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2016.03.018
0048-7333/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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tion for innovation by KIBS ﬁrms in two main ways. First, we  argue
that although KIBS ﬁrms do not typically consider formal appropri-
ability mechanisms (such as patents, copyrights and trademarks)
to be central mechanisms for capturing value from innovation,
they are however important for their innovation collaboration. We
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive association between the importance of
innovation collaboration and the importance of formal appropri-
ability mechanisms in general. This signiﬁcant positive association
between the importance of innovation collaboration and that of
formal appropriability mechanisms holds in particular consistently
for collaboration for innovation with suppliers, competitors, con-
sultants, commercial labs, or private R&D institutes, universities
and government or public research institutes. This is because for-
mal  appropriability mechanisms may  facilitate collaboration for
innovation by serving as signals of innovation capabilities, or by
providing a framework for what knowledge is shared and what
remains private (Audretsch et al., 2012; Hagedoorn and Zober,
2015).
Second, we build on earlier work showing the existence of a
concave relation between innovation collaboration and importance
of appropriability strategies for manufacturing ﬁrms (Laursen and
Salter, 2014), and extend this for KIBS ﬁrms. In particular, we ﬁnd
a signiﬁcant inverted U-shaped association between the impor-
tance of ﬁrms’ innovation collaboration with clients and that of
formal appropriability mechanisms. The importance of innovation
collaboration with clients goes hand-in-hand with the importance
of formal appropriability mechanisms, although a negative relation
appears when ﬁrms assign very high importance to formal appro-
priability mechanisms. Thus, modest levels of emphasis on formal
appropriability mechanisms may  prevent conﬂicts over ownership
of jointly developed knowledge assets and knowledge leakages,
while also avoiding the possibly negative effects of overly strict con-
trols by legal departments on innovation collaboration. As well as
exploring formal appropriability mechanisms, we  also investigate
the relationship between contractual and strategic appropriability
mechanisms and innovation collaboration for KIBS ﬁrms.
We provide next the theoretical framework of the study. After
that, we describe the data and the methods. We then present the
ﬁndings. Implications and conclusions follow. Finally, we  discuss
the limitations of our research.
2. Theoretical framework: collaboration and
appropriability by KIBS ﬁrms
First, we explore the peculiarities of innovation and collabora-
tion with external organisations by KIBS ﬁrms. Second, we explore
appropriability and collaboration for innovation by KIBS ﬁrms.
2.1. Innovation and collaboration by KIBS ﬁrms
There are two main difﬁculties in conceptualising innovation
by KIBS ﬁrms. First, innovation by KIBS ﬁrms is hard to analyse,
categorise, and measure, as it often involves simultaneously new
services, new ways of producing and delivering services, new forms
of client interaction, and new forms of quality control and assur-
ance (den Hertog, 2000). A second complicating factor is that there
is great heterogeneity among KIBS ﬁrms regarding the way they
undertake innovation (Miozzo and Soete, 2001; Evangelista, 2000).
KIBS ﬁrms can vary from “system integrator” ﬁrms, which develop
complex engineering or IT “solutions” that meet the needs of large
client organisations (Davies, 2004; Miozzo and Grimshaw, 2011),
to professional services ﬁrms such as R&D, design or management
consultancy, that help their client organisations to change in the
course of implementing new or improved technologies or opera-
tions (Hansen et al., 1999; Miozzo et al., 2012).
Despite this heterogeneity, however, a deﬁning feature of KIBS
ﬁrms is that they are involved in the continuous creation and
transfer of knowledge in collaboration with other organisations,
especially with client organisations (Doloreaux and Shearmur,
2012; Gallouj and Weinstein, 1997; Jones et al., 1998). Also, all KIBS
ﬁrms are unusually high in terms of the share of graduate and pro-
fessional employment compared to ﬁrms in other sectors of the
economy. These graduates are trained in different knowledge areas
− some specialise in scientiﬁc and technical knowledge, others
more in administrative, managerial or socio-legal issues (European
Commission, 2004). This means that KIBS ﬁrms must adopt mea-
sures to retain these valuable high-skilled professional employees,
and prevent them from being poached by competitors.
With the exception of ﬁrms in a few science- and technology-
based sectors, KIBS ﬁrms do not typically have R&D departments.
Instead, innovations tend to be developed in the course of speciﬁc
projects for clients, and therefore are not always easy to distinguish
from the customisation of the usual service. Scholars refer to the
notion of “co-production” of knowledge with clients to denote the
way that routine work for speciﬁc clients relies on clients’ trans-
fer of (partly tacit) knowledge, and how this is intertwined with
learning and innovation on one or both sides of the relationship
(Bettencourt et al., 2002).
Drawing on surveys such as the European Innobarometer and
the Community Innovation Survey, researchers have emphasised
the importance of innovation collaboration with clients for ser-
vices ﬁrms. Among their ﬁndings is that service ﬁrms are less likely
than manufacturing ﬁrms to collaborate for innovation with uni-
versities or suppliers, but more likely to collaborate with clients
(Arundel et al., 2007). Also, service ﬁrms are less likely than manu-
facturing ﬁrms to source new technologies through in-house R&D,
through the acquisition of advanced machinery and equipment, or
through collaborations with universities and research institutes.
Instead, innovating services ﬁrms are more likely to source new
technologies through collaborations with clients and suppliers, or
through the acquisition of external intellectual property (Tether,
2005). In general, evidence from the surveys indicates that innova-
tion in services ﬁrms does not seem to follow dramatically different
paths from those displayed by manufacturing ﬁrms, but differences
appear to be more of degree than of kind.
A recent stream of research on open innovation in services
(Chesbrough, 2011) has stimulated renewed interest on collabo-
ration for innovation by services ﬁrms. Mina et al. (2014), using a
survey to study the open innovation practices of UK business ser-
vices ﬁrms, ﬁnd that they are in fact more open seekers of external
knowledge than manufacturing ﬁrms. Innovation collaboration by
business service ﬁrms tends to increase with R&D intensity and
with human capital intensity. While both clients, on the one hand,
and universities and other research organisations, on the other,
are important as a source of external knowledge for business ser-
vices, they ﬁnd, contrary to the Arundel et al. (2007) study, that
universities and public research organisations are relatively more
important. This may  be understood in the light of Love et al.’s (2011)
exploration of openness in different stages of UK business services
ﬁrms’ innovation processes: collaboration with clients is impor-
tant at the early stage, collaboration with research organisations at
the intermediate stage, and collaboration with professional associ-
ations at the exploitation stage of innovation.
Like ﬁrms in manufacturing sectors, KIBS ﬁrms seek to reduce
involuntary leakages or transfers of knowledge in the process of
innovation collaboration. But, in the case of KIBS ﬁrms, since joint
knowledge creation, especially with clients, is the norm, regular
conﬂict over ownership of the jointly-developed knowledge assets
may  be more likely. The services provider is likely to want to repli-
cate the solution, process, or design in projects with other clients;
the client might want to use it in its own other activities, and may
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want to prevent it from being offered to its competitors (Leiponen,
2008). For example, a study of IT services found evidence of cases
where IT services providers also provided services to ﬁrms in direct
competition with their existing clients; this led to client ﬁrms fear-
ing knowledge leakages and the replication of IT systems that had
delivered them a competitive edge (Miozzo and Grimshaw, 2005).
The study stressed the need for frequent discussion, negotiation
and re-negotiation to reconcile objectives and interests between
the client and KIBS ﬁrm, and to institutionalise processes for man-
aging such conﬂicts over intellectual property rights.
In particular, the insight that innovations are developed in the
course of speciﬁc projects with clients provides a rationale to sin-
gle out in our analysis collaboration with clients from collaboration
with other external organisations. We  suggest that working with
clients may  require KIBS ﬁrms to pay extra attention to their appro-
priability strategy in the face of conﬂicting objectives. KIBS ﬁrms
may  not only be concerned about knowledge leakages in innova-
tion collaboration with external organisations, but also experience
conﬂicts in establishing ownership over jointly-created knowl-
edge assets with clients. KIBS ﬁrms and their clients may  have
different objectives, with KIBS ﬁrms wanting to replicate the inno-
vations developed jointly with a particular client with other clients,
and clients being concerned about KIBS ﬁrms’ offering the jointly-
developed innovation to their competitors.
2.2. Collaboration and appropriability by KIBS ﬁrms
While the relationship between external innovation collab-
oration and appropriability strategy has received considerable
attention in the context of manufacturing ﬁrms, this has been less
explored for KIBS ﬁrms. There are two polar positions in the liter-
ature examining the relation between appropriablity strategy and
innovation collaboration for manufacturing ﬁrms. On the one hand,
one group argues that appropriability mechanisms can help het-
erogeneous partners collaborate for innovation and that, in strong
appropriability regimes (where imitation is difﬁcult either because
of strong formal appropriability mechanisms or difﬁcult-to-imitate
technology), ﬁrms are more willing to collaborate for innovation
(Pisano and Teece, 2007; Graham and Mowery, 2006). On the other
hand, there are those who argue that innovation collaboration may
be facilitated when ﬁrms deliberately reduce their use of some of
their intellectual property rights (Chesbrough 2003; von Hippel and
von Krogh, 2006). In support of the latter position, both Henkel et al.
(2014) and Alexy et al. (2009) note that revealing freely or “selec-
tively” core technologies can draw more users into ﬁrms’ product
ecosystems.
Firms typically protect rents due to innovation by using a range
of appropriability mechanisms, including patents, copyrights,
trademarks, design rights, conﬁdentiality agreements, secrecy,
employment contracts, lead-time advantages, complexity of prod-
uct/process, and complementary assets. Although patents have
been the main focus of attention on debates on innovation
incentives, these tend to be the least emphasised appropriability
mechanisms in most manufacturing sectors, with ﬁrms emphasis-
ing more heavily secrecy and lead-time advantages (Cohen et al.,
2000; Hall et al., 2014; Leiponen and Byma, 2009).1
1 The importance of patents, however, has been increasing compared to earlier
surveys (see Levin et al., 1987). Firms often patent for reasons other than proﬁting
from a patented innovation through its commercialisation or licensing. In addition to
preventing copying, the most important reasons to patent include preventing com-
petitors from patenting related inventions (“patent blocking”), forcing competitors
into negotiations, and preventing lawsuits (Cohen et al., 2000). The broad role of
patents was  already envisaged in a historical study of the chemical industry, where
Arora (1997) shows that how patents are used (or not used) affects opportunities
for entry, industry structure and the rate of technological change itself.
Formal appropriability mechanisms, including patents, may
facilitate innovation collaboration by providing a framework for
what knowledge is shared and what remains private. Hagedoorn
and Zober (2015) report on a survey of ﬁrms active in innovation
collaboration: 90% of ﬁrms regarded patents, 86% trade secrets, 71%
trademarks, and 64% design rights as the most important instru-
ments for protecting the innovative capabilities of ﬁrms from their
innovation partners. Approprability mechanisms can also facilitate
the ﬂow of the tacit component of knowledge—for example, when
clauses of assistance and/or exchange of employees are included in
licensing contracts (Foray, 2004).
Appropriability mechanisms can also signal innovative capa-
bilities to potential partners. Having control over particular and
valuable knowledge assets helps partners to identify each other,
and can alert potential users as to the availability of the technol-
ogy. For example, some ﬁrms are known to screen patent databases
to identify potential partners for collaboration (Alexy et al., 2009;
Audretsch et al., 2012). Also, possessing technical and commercial
information in the form of trade secrets is considered an impor-
tant signal of innovation capabilities (Hagedoorn and Zober, 2015).
This signalling dimension of appropriability mechanisms is all the
more important because ﬁrms operate with incomplete informa-
tion regarding other ﬁrms’ activities and innovative capabilities,
and the value of their innovations.
Nevertheless, even when particular appropriability mecha-
nisms contribute to external innovation collaboration, placing high
levels of emphasis on them can be harmful for collaboration. Using
panel data from three successive waves of a large-scale survey of UK
manufacturing ﬁrms, Laursen and Salter (2014) ﬁnd a concave rela-
tion between ﬁrms’ breadth of external search and collaboration for
innovation, and the strength of the ﬁrms’ appropriability strategies.
The authors explain the negative consequences of placing heavy
emphasis on formal appropriability and innovation collaboration
on the basis of strict controls by legal departments of collaborative
relationships, complex organisational processes in place for getting
approval for joint projects, conﬂicts over ownership of intellectual
property, and complex inter-organisational negotiations damaging
trust. Similarly, heavy emphasis on secrecy has been shown to cause
discontent among employees, inhibit learning, and restrict oppor-
tunities for innovation collaboration (Liebeskind, 1997). Indeed,
imposing restrictive secrecy rules cause loss of trust, and exces-
sive use of security rules and monitoring procedures incurs labour
and material costs.
There is some evidence that formal appropriability mechanisms
are even less important for capturing value for services ﬁrms than
for manufacturing ﬁrms (Hipp, 2008; Miles et al., 2000). Not only
is the product of service innovation in many cases not suitable for
patenting, but also KIBS ﬁrms’ innovations may  require less upfront
investment (for many KIBS – but not all – there is no need for large
R&D labs, engineering teams, costly equipment, and expensive clin-
ical trials). Service innovation can be difﬁcult to copy, for example,
because of reliance on the input of highly-skilled and experienced
professionals (Samuelson, 2010).
While much innovative output from services ﬁrms can not be
effectively protected by patents, since the 1990s, patents have
been applicable to some aspects of computer software in most
economies (Hall and MacGarvie, 2006). There have been histor-
ical swings in the patentability of business methods (including
auction methods, e-commerce techniques, and banking and ﬁnan-
cial services methods), with a more restrictive approach to their
patentability since the late 1990s (Andersen and Howells, 2000).
The copyright system has long been applied to published works:
its application to innovative activity is much more recent and ill-
deﬁned, though copyright ofﬁces in most countries have accepted
registration of computer programs since the mid-1960s. The less
important role of patents in capturing value from innovation for
1340 M. Miozzo et al. / Research Policy 45 (2016) 1337–1351
services compared to manufacturing ﬁrms is currently challenged
by Mina et al. (2014), who ﬁnd that the use of patents is as impor-
tant for business services as for manufacturing ﬁrms, and is more
important than strategic appropriability mechanisms.
Thus, a further issue is that services ﬁrms, including KIBS, are
argued to use mechanisms other than formal appropriability mech-
anisms to protect their knowledge. There is some evidence that
they attempt to capture value from innovation mainly through con-
tracts, secrecy, and a variety of strategic mechanisms, including
lead-time advantages, making intangible products more tangi-
ble (e.g. embedding software in microchips), creating lock-in
effects (such as offering bounded value-for-money services, loy-
alty cards, and, in the case of software and IT services, providing
easy interoperability), and building entry barriers (such as the
institutionalisation of professional qualiﬁcations and accredita-
tion systems) (Greenwood et al., 2005; Hurmelinna-Laukkanen and
Ritala, 2010; Miles et al., 2000).
Contracts with clients and other organisations are not only an
important mechanism to capture value from innovation but also to
head off conﬂicts in innovation collaboration by KIBS ﬁrms, or at
least of limiting how far they escalate. The case of the collaboration
between the IT services provider EDS (now part of HP) and the aero-
engine ﬁrm Rolls Royce in a “business transformation programme”,
might be instructive. EDS provided a range of innovative IT ser-
vices to Rolls Royce, including IT support for product development,
manufacturing processes, supply-chain management, and repair
and overhaul. To facilitate knowledge transfer and avoid conﬂicts
over jointly-developed knowledge assets, the ﬁrms signed a com-
plex contract with shared costs and proﬁts (Miozzo and Grimshaw,
2005). Other studies also underline the importance of complex con-
tracts between knowledge-intensive services suppliers and their
clients in joint innovation collaboration (Massini and Miozzo, 2012;
Miozzo and Grimshaw, 2011).
Similarly, Leiponen (2008) explores the role of exclusive
arrangements, preventing knowledge-intensive services suppliers
from servicing the clients’ competitors. She shows that large and
powerful clients prefer tighter control over jointly-created knowl-
edge, although they might beneﬁt more from providing greater
incentives for fast knowledge creation by knowledge-intensive ser-
vices suppliers rather than from tight control.
Thus, in order to enrich our understanding of how the choices of
KIBS ﬁrms to collaborate for innovation with external partners are
related to their appropriability strategies, this paper presents the
results of exploratory research. We  explore the relation between
the importance of innovation collaboration and that of different
types of appropriability mechanisms. Building on existing work
(Greenwood et al., 2005; Hurmelinna-Laukkanen and Ritala, 2010;
Miles et al., 2000), we consider different types of appropriability
mechanisms that are relevant to KIBS ﬁrms: formal, contractual
and strategic. We  also build on previous work on innovation col-
laboration and appropriability carried out for manufacturing ﬁrms
(Laursen and Salter, 2014). Nevertheless, we expect that some fea-
tures that are “heightened” in KIBS ﬁrms, such as the emphasis on
highly-skilled and experienced professionals, and the importance
of the interaction with clients for innovation, may  affect the relation
between the choice among (and levels of emphasis on) different
appropriability mechanisms and that of innovation collaboration
with external partners.
3. Data and methods
We  draw on an original survey administered through telephone
interviews between September and December 2012. The sampling
frame is the UK and US publicly-traded knowledge-intensive ser-
vice ﬁrms listed in Datastream.2 The UK and USA have relatively
similar business and innovation systems, and legal frameworks
for intellectual property protection; knowledge-intensive business
services account for a large percentage of GDP in both countries.
The initial list comprises 406 UK and 1892 US ﬁrms. The respon-
dents were in senior managerial positions, including CEO, CFO, head
of marketing, head of communications, head of business develop-
ment, and technical project manager. The survey resulted in 223
responses (92 UK and 131 US ﬁrms).3 The overall response rate is
10.3%, which is comparable to several previous studies (e.g. Mina
et al., 2014). However, the response rates are signiﬁcantly differ-
ent in the UK and the US (23% and 7% respectively). Appendix
Table A1 shows details of the assessment of the survey’s non-
response bias using the characteristic comparison method (Lawton
and Parasuraman, 1980), which compares respondents and non-
respondents by country, ﬁrm size (number of employees) and
industrial sector (2-digit SIC code): UK ﬁrms and large ﬁrms are
over-represented in the ﬁnal sample.
The biases in favour of UK ﬁrms and large ﬁrms require the use of
appropriate weight adjustment techniques (e.g., Love et al., 2011).
We assign underrepresented groups of respondents higher weights
compared with overrepresented groups in our regression, based on
the inverse response propensity as assessed using logistic regres-
sion modelling (David et al., 1983; Kalton and Flores-Cervantes,
2003).4 Indeed, we regress whether each of the 406 UK and 1892
US ﬁrms responded to our survey (yes = 1 and no = 0) on variables
capturing auxiliary ﬁrm information about ﬁrm size (the number of
employees) and country of origin (US or UK). The reciprocal of each
ﬁrm’s propensity to respond to the survey is then used to weight
observations on each sample ﬁrm.5
The unit of analysis in the regressions is the portfolio of either
product or process innovations that were introduced by our sam-
ple ﬁrms between 2009 and 2011 (see the description of the
dependent variables below). During the survey period, a ﬁrm may
introduce both product and process innovations. In such a case,
for the ﬁrm, two  units of innovations (i.e. product innovations
and process innovations) are used for the analysis. We  adopt a
two-stage cluster sampling design. The primary sampling units are
ﬁrms, and the secondary sampling units are their portfolios of
product or process innovations.6 Because some ﬁrms introduced
2 These include ﬁrms operating in the following sectors: telecommunications,
ﬁnancial intermediation and auxiliary activities, research and development, legal
services, accounting, book-keeping and auditing, tax consultancy, market research
and public opinion polling, business and management consultancy, management
activities of holding companies, architectural and engineering activities and related
technical consultancy, and technical testing and analysis. The ﬁrst two of this list
have substantial consumer markets, and thus are usually excluded from business
services though labelled knowledge-intensive services; since they are essential
for business activities, they are often described as belonging to the category of
“business-related services”.
3 We use Cochran’s sample size formula (Cochran, 1977) to determine the ade-
quacy of our sample size. As our key variables are constructed from a ﬁve-point
scale (as illustrated later in the section about variables) and we set an alpha level
of 0.1 and the acceptable level of error at 5%, the required sample size is around 68.
Therefore, our achieved sample size is adequate for regression analysis.
4 Eisen et al. (2012) provide a detailed empirical example of the application of
inverse response propensity weights to adjust non-response bias for survey analysis.
5 The advantage of using this weighting method for the adjustment of non-
response bias (compared to post-stratiﬁcation weighting for instance) is that any
continuous variable that are associated with non-responses (such as the number
of  employees) can also be adjusted without assigning them to somewhat arbitrary
categories.
6 The sample is self-weighted in that all the sampling frame ﬁrms were contacted
and  for each ﬁrm that responded, its portfolios of product or process innovations
were surveyed. Therefore, weights are given only to adjust for non-response bias
(because of the sampling design, the sample does not have to be weighted). As there
is  no information available at the innovation level about the survey population,
non-response bias is adjusted at ﬁrm level.
M. Miozzo et al. / Research Policy 45 (2016) 1337–1351 1341
both product and process innovations over the same period, we use
the Huber-White cluster-robust standard error estimator (Rogers,
1993; White, 1980; Williams, 2000) in order to adjust for intra-ﬁrm
correlation and ensure consistent inference. Furthermore, using
a robust heteroscedasticity-consistent (rather than the standard
OLS) estimator, we account for the presence of heteroscedasticity
of unknown form (White, 1980).
The relationship between the importance of innovation collab-
oration and that of appropriability mechanisms is analysed using
multiple regression analysis (adjusted by country and ﬁrm size).
The analysis was carried out using STATA 10. The ﬁnal sample in
the analysis comprises 233 product and process innovations, clus-
tered into 153 innovating ﬁrms (i.e., the analysis is conducted using
ﬁrms which introduced at least one innovation during the period
2009–2011). There are two reasons for this research design. First,
for each portfolio of product or process innovations, we asked each
respondent to give scores regarding the signiﬁcance of the various
types of appropriability mechanisms to protect the speciﬁc group
of innovations. This enables us to distinguish whether product and
process innovations are protected differently.7 Second, if a ﬁrm had
introduced no innovations during the survey period, there would
be no reason to ask how the ﬁrm protected its innovation.
3.1. Dependent variables
Following the questions used in the Community Innovation Sur-
vey, we asked ﬁrm representatives whether the ﬁrm cooperated
with each of the following partners for innovation: (1) clients or
customers, (2) suppliers, (3) competitors, (4) consultants, com-
mercial labs, or private R&D institutes, (5) universities, and (6)
government or public research institutes. We  also asked them to
score from 1 to 5 how important the partner is for the ﬁrm’s creation
of innovation (when the ﬁrm did not collaborate with a particular
type of partner, a score of zero is awarded). We  chose to single
out clients because of the important role attached to innovation
collaboration with clients in the existing literature (Bettencourt
et al., 2002; den Hertog, 2000; Arundel et al., 2007). This means
that scores for the importance of collaboration for innovation for
clients – integers ranging from 0 to 5 – are used as dependent vari-
ables for a set of regressions. Furthermore, we follow the approach
of Amara et al. (2008) and created an extra variable ‘importance of
innovation collaboration with all other partners’, using the average
of the scores of perceived importance of suppliers, competitors,
consultants, commercial labs, or private R&D institutes, universi-
ties and government or public research institutes (i.e. partner types
2–6) for innovation ( = 0.55),8 as an additional dependent variable
for the assessment of the relationship between ﬁrms’ appropriabil-
ity strategies and the importance of innovation collaboration with
other partners regardless of whether ﬁrms collaborate with clients
or not. This index therefore measures the aggregate level of impor-
tance of innovation collaboration with suppliers, competitors,
consultants, commercial labs, or private R&D institutes, universities
and government or public research institutes, without differentiat-
ing by partner type. The values of the composite index that captures
the average importance of collaboration with these external part-
ners can range from 0 to 5, and are not necessarily integers.
3.2. Explanatory variables
For each portfolio of product or process innovations, we asked
respondents to give a score from 1 to 5 indicating how signiﬁcant
each of several mechanisms has been in protecting this speciﬁc
7 Many innovation surveys ask about product and process innovations, but then
do  not request information speciﬁc to these.
8 A Cronbach’s  value of 0.5 is acceptable for short item scales (Bowling, 2002).
portfolio from copying or imitation by competitors or for otherwise
capturing value from their ﬁrm’s innovations. The mechanisms
are: (1) patents (excluding business method patents), (2) busi-
ness method patents, (3) copyrights, (4) trademarks, (5) design
rights, (6) conﬁdentiality agreements, (7) employment contracts,
(8) secrecy, (9) lead-time advantages, (10) complexity of the service
or service process, and (11) complementary service development
and delivery capabilities (this list follows the Community Innova-
tion Survey, but includes additional appropriability mechanisms).
Responses were factor analysed, using principal component anal-
ysis as the extraction method, Varimax as the rotation method,
and retaining factors that explain more than 70% of the variance as
factor selection criteria. Three types of signiﬁcant appropriability
orientations were identiﬁed as a result (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin mea-
sure of sampling adequacy = 0.864) (Table 1), and factor scores for
each orientation are calculated by regression methods. The three
orientations towards appropriability mechanisms are labelled ‘for-
mal’, ‘contractual’ and ‘strategic’. A formal orientation emphasises
the signiﬁcance of patents, copyrights, trademarks and design
rights to capture value from innovation by ﬁrms. A contractual
orientation highlights the signiﬁcance of conﬁdentiality agree-
ments, employment contracts, and secrecy to capture value from
innovation.9 A strategic orientation stresses the importance of lead-
time advantages, complexity of the service or service process, and
complementary service development and delivery capabilities to
capture value from innovation. Appendix Table A2 provides further
information on data validity. Also, in light of previous research that
identiﬁes a concave relation between the importance of innovation
collaboration and that of different levels of emphasis on appro-
priability mechanisms (Laursen and Salter, 2014), we introduce
squared terms of the three types of appropriability orientations.
3.3. Control variables
We include a number of control variables suggested as rele-
vant by the literature. First, a ﬁrm’s R&D investments may  affect its
capacity to absorb external knowledge (e.g. Cohen and Levinthal,
1990), thus we construct the index ‘R&D investments’based on a
survey question following the Community Innovation Survey. The
question asked respondents whether they spent, for the year 2011,
more than 1% of their turnover in support of innovation on each
of the following activities: (1) conducting R&D internally (yes = 1
and no = 0), (2) acquisition of machinery, equipment and software
(yes = 1 and no = 0), (3) training for innovative activities (yes = 1 and
no = 0), and (4) all forms of design (yes = 1 and no = 0). We  use the
average of the standardised item scores ( = 0.66). Second, as prod-
uct or process innovation inﬂuences a ﬁrm’s collaboration with
different types of partners (Fitjar and Rodríguez-Pose, 2013), we
include in the model whether the innovation is a product inno-
vation or not (product innovation = 1 and process innovation = 0).
Additionally, we  control for other variables, including whether the
ﬁrm is located in the USA (USA = 1 and UK = 0), ﬁrm size (log of the
number of employees) and the type of sector in which the ﬁrm
9 Secrecy is typically classiﬁed as a strategic appropriability mechanism, but the
factor analysis groups it together with conﬁdentiality agreements and employ-
ment contracts; so we call this group for simplicity ‘contractual appropriability
mechanisms’. Nevertheless, there are indeed some “contractual” aspects of secrecy.
Although there are trade secrets laws which legally forbid employees of a ﬁrm to
provide outsiders with documents connected to the business of the ﬁrm, unlike for-
mal  appropriability mechanisms such as patents, trade secrets laws do not protect
against competitors using “fair” means to replicate the knowledge, protection does
not extend to non-codiﬁed knowledge, and infringement is difﬁcult to prosecute
unless the employee has entered into an explicit contract of trade secrets with the
ﬁrm, and the ﬁrm has made efforts to safeguard the secrecy of the piece of knowledge
concerned (Liebeskind, 1997).
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Fig. 1. Partners with which ﬁrms cooperate for innovation (%) (N = 153; weighted results).
Note: The survey question asked each ﬁrm that had introduced innovations whether the ﬁrm cooperated with each of the various partners for innovation.
Fig. 2. Mean scores of signiﬁcance of appropriability mechanisms (N = 233; weighted results).
Note: The survey question asked each ﬁrm that had introduced innovations, for each portfolio of (product or process) innovations, to score from 1 to 5 how signiﬁcant each
of  several mechanisms has been in protecting this speciﬁc group of innovation from copying or imitation by competitors or for otherwise capturing value from their ﬁrms’
innovation.
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Table  1
Factor analysis results.
Items Rotated factor loadings
Formal appropriability
mechanisms
Contractual appropriability
mechanisms
Strategic appropriability
mechanisms
Patents 0.80 0.00 0.36
Business method patents 0.83 0.02 0.31
Copyrights 0.82 0.36 0.04
Trademarks 0.77 0.48 0.00
Design rights 0.74 0.38 0.14
Conﬁdentiality agreements 0.23 0.80 0.27
Secrecy 0.23 0.72 0.34
Employment contracts 0.21 0.76 0.29
Lead-time advantages 0.23 0.28 0.74
Complexity of service product/process/design 0.14 0.18 0.83
Complementary service development and delivery capabilities 0.20 0.43 0.73
operates (seven industry dummies using the ﬁrms’ primary 2-digit
SIC code).
The objective of this paper is to explore the association between
the importance of innovation collaboration with external part-
ners and that of different appropriability mechanisms. The nature
of this study is exploratory; we intend to uncover associations,
rather than to establish casual relationships between the nominally
dependent and independent variables. Hence, we  do not imply that
ﬁrms decide on what appropriability mechanisms to use and then
whether to seek (certain) external partners for innovation. Nor do
we claim the reverse: that ﬁrms decide ﬁrst about their choice of
collaboration strategy and then decide about their appropriability
strategy. Both are possible in principle, and ﬁrm strategies almost
inevitably evolve over time. The relation between the two sets of
variables is likely to be determined by a number of factors, including
the nature of the service, the types of innovations introduced, the
capabilities of the ﬁrm, the type of knowledge required for innova-
tion, and the type of sector. In particular, results may  be inﬂuenced
by the self-selection of appropriability and collaboration strategies
by “high-quality” ﬁrms (Laursen and Salter, 2014). Consequently,
further steps were taken to enhance the robustness of the analysis.
We adopted two indicators of ﬁrm “quality”. One indicator of qual-
ity is the number of innovations introduced by the sample ﬁrms. We
thus asked respondents to state the number of products and pro-
cess innovations their ﬁrms introduced between 2009 and 2011.
A second indicator is the growth rate of the ﬁrms’ total assets (in
thousand US dollars) over the three-year period (2009–2011) up to
the year of the survey (e.g., Weinzimmer et al., 1998). Firm growth
rate is calculated from the difference in total assets between 2011
and 2009, divided by the value of total assets in 2009 and multiplied
by 100.
4. Findings
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Strikingly, the survey shows that the sample ﬁrms collaborate
extensively for innovation. Cooperation with clients/customers is
the most important type of collaboration in the innovation process,
with 87% of ﬁrms cooperating with this type of partner (Fig. 1).
Suppliers of materials, equipment or software are the second most
important partners in the innovation process, with 65% of ﬁrms
cooperating with this type of partner. This is followed by coopera-
tion with consultants, commercial labs, or private R&D institutes
(58% of ﬁrms), competitors (49%), universities or other higher
education institutions (34%), and government or public research
institutes (29%).
Regarding the relative signiﬁcance of each appropriability
mechanism, conﬁdentiality agreements, secrecy, employment con-
tracts, complementary capabilities and complexity in service
design are perceived to be amongst the most important means
of capturing value from innovation (Fig. 2). According to our
respondents, formal appropriability mechanisms are less impor-
tant than contractual or strategic appropriability mechanisms. In
fact, patents were the least important of all the methods considered
for capturing value from innovation.
4.2. Regression analysis
Tables 2 and 3 present the descriptive statistics and correlation
coefﬁcients among the variables. Table 4 presents the regression
results using cluster-robust estimators (which take into account
intra-ﬁrm correlation) for both the full speciﬁcation, and a reduced
version without the squared terms, in order to assess whether the
estimated effects behave consistently in the two speciﬁcations. The
inclusion of the squared terms improves the ﬁt of our model to the
data in the regressions of collaboration with clients, as reﬂected in
the F-test for the change in R-squared between the reduced and the
full speciﬁcation.
To assess the risk of multicollinearity in the regression analysis,
we calculated the variance inﬂation factors (VIFs) among the pre-
dictor variables for the two  full speciﬁcation models. The maximum
estimated VIF across our explanatory variables for both models
was 4.87 and the mean value was  1.86, which are well below the
recommended ceiling of 10 (Wooldridge, 2000).
Following Shugart et al. (2005), we use graphical represen-
tations of the predicted results with 90% conﬁdence intervals
to interpret regression results from the nonlinear models. The
approach is useful for the interpretation of speciﬁc effects in cases in
which coefﬁcients of relevant variables from the regression results
are not all statistically signiﬁcant in nonlinear models.
Four key ﬁndings emerge from the regression results. First,
despite previous evidence from existing literature and our sur-
vey that formal appropriability mechanisms are less relevant for
capturing value from innovation by KIBS ﬁrms than contractual
or strategic mechanisms, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive associa-
tion between the importance of innovation collaboration and the
importance of formal appropriability mechanisms in general. This
signiﬁcant positive association between the importance of innova-
tion collaboration and that of formal appropriability mechanisms
holds in particular consistently for collaboration for innovation
with all other partners (i.e. suppliers, competitors, consultants,
commercial labs, or private R&D institutes, universities, and gov-
ernment or public research institutes) (see Table 4 and Figs. 3 and 4).
Second, there is however a maximum limit, or a turning point,
to the positive association between the importance of innovation
with clients and the importance of formal appropriability mecha-
nisms. We  ﬁnd a signiﬁcant inverted U-shaped relation between
the importance of ﬁrms’ innovation collaboration with clients and
that of formal appropriability mechanisms (column 2 in Table 4). As
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics for variables (weighted results).
Variables Type of variables Description Mean Std. Dev.
Firm level
Importance of innovation collaboration
Importance of innovation collaboration
with clients
Scores; continuous Scores from 1 to 5 how important clients are
for the ﬁrm’s creation of innovation (when the
ﬁrm did not collaborate with clients, a score of
zero is awarded).
3.67 1.68
Importance of innovation collaboration
with all other partners
Index: 5 items
(Cronbach’s alpha value = 0.55)
Scores from 1 to 5 how important the
following partners are for the ﬁrm’s creation of
innovation (when the ﬁrm did not collaborate
with clients, a score of zero is awarded)
1.56 1.00
1)  suppliers
2) competitors
3) consultants, commercial labs, or private
R&D institutes
4) universities
5) government or public research
institutes.
R&D investments Index: 4 items
(Cronbach’s alpha value = 0.66)
Whether respondents spent, for the year 2011,
more than 1% of their turnover in support of
innovation on each of the following activities
0.17 0.66
1)  conducting R&D internally (yes = 1 and
no = 0)
2) acquisition of machinery, equipment
and software (yes = 1 and no = 0)
3) training for innovative activities (yes = 1
and no = 0)
4) all forms of design (yes = 1 and no = 0).
Number of employees (log) Continuous log of the number of employees 5.68 2.16
Firm  growth rate Continuous (%) The difference in total assets between 2011
and 2009, divided by the value of total assets in
2009 and multiplied by 100
77.78 382.84
US  ﬁrm Categorical Whether the ﬁrm is located in the USA (yes = 1
and no = 0)
0.82 0.38
Groups of innovation level
Orientation to formal appropriability
mechanisms
Index: factor scores from
regression methods
Factor analysis results; see Table 1 0.11 0.98
Orientation to contractual
appropriability mechanisms
Index: factor scores from
regression methods
Factor analysis results; see Table 1 −0.03 0.98
Orientation to strategic appropriability
mechanisms
Index: factor scores from
regression methods
Factor analysis results; see Table 1 −0.05 0.98
Product innovation Categorical Whether the innovation is a product
innovation (yes = 1 and no = 0)
0.59 0.49
Number of innovations Continuous The number of product or process innovations
introduced between 2009 and 2011
6.78 24.64
N  = 233
Table 3
Correlation Table (weighted results).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Importance of innovation collaboration with clients 1.00
2.  Importance of innovation collaboration with other partners 0.26*** 1.00
3.  Orientation to formal appropriability mechanisms 0.22*** 0.25*** 1.00
4.  Orientation to contractual appropriability mechanisms 0.19*** 0.12** 0.00 1.00
5.  Orientation to strategic appropriability mechanisms 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.00 1.00
6.  R&D investments 0.12* 0.25*** 0.17*** 0.01 0.28*** 1.00
7.  Product innovation 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.03 1.00
8.  Number of innovations 0.07 0.08 −0.13 0.12 −0.11 −0.06 0.02 1.00
9.  Number of employees (log) 0.14** 0.25*** 0.13* 0.22*** 0.01 −0.05 −0.00 0.16 1.00
10.  Firm growth rate 0.08 0.07 0.17 −0.00 0.08* 0.14 −0.03 −0.01 −0.22* 1.00
11.  US ﬁrm 0.09 0.17*** 0.29*** −0.04 −0.03 0.12* −0.03 −0.14* −0.15** 0.08 1.00
* signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
can be seen from Fig. 4, the turning point of the curve occurs when
a ﬁrm’s orientation to formal appropriability mechanism is about
0.64, which is above the mean level of the variable of 0.11 (Table 2).
This suggests that initially the importance of innovation collabora-
tion with clients goes hand-in-hand with the importance of formal
appropriability mechanisms, but a negative relation appears when
ﬁrms assign very high importance to formal appropriability mech-
anisms.
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Table  4
Regression analysis (weighted results).
Dependent variable
Importance of innovation collaboration with
clients
Importance of innovation collaboration with all
other partners
Coef. (Robust Std. Err.) Coef. (Robust Std. Err.)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Formal  0.37* 0.50** 0.27** 0.26**
(0.21) (0.21) (0.11) (0.11)
Formal  squared −0.39** −0.04
(0.17) (0.10)
Contractual 0.17 0.21 0.02 0.01
(0.16) (0.15) (0.08) (0.08)
Contractual squared −0.15 −0.10*
(0.13) (0.05)
Strategic −0.08 −0.03 0.03 0.00
(0.19) (0.16) (0.08) (0.09)
Strategic squared 0.19* 0.04
(0.10) (0.06)
R&D  investments 0.25 0.28 0.34** 0.35**
(0.26) (0.24) (0.13) (0.14)
Product  innovation 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.01
(0.13) (0.14) (0.09) (0.09)
Number  of innovations 0.00 0.00* 0.00** 0.00**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Number  of employees (log) 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
Firm  growth rate 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
USA  −0.04 −0.11 0.07 0.07
(0.39) (0.39) (0.19) (0.19)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 2.89*** 3.10*** 0.91** 1.00**
(0.94) (0.90) (0.42) (0.43)
R squared 0.16 0.21 0.20 0.21
F-test  for model 2.90*** 3.06*** 4.59*** 3.92***
F-test for R squared change 2.87** 1.28
N  observations 233 233 233 233
Note: (1) Main effects model with ‘importance of innovation collaboration with clients’ as the dependent variable.
(2)  Full speciﬁcation model with ‘importance of innovation collaboration with clients’ as the dependent variable.
(3)  Main effects model with ‘importance of innovation collaboration with all other partners’ as the dependent variable.
(4)  Full speciﬁcation model with ‘importance of innovation collaboration with all other partners’ as the dependent variable.
* signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Third, regression results suggest a signiﬁcant inverted U-shaped
relation between the importance of innovation collaboration with
all other partners and the importance of contractual appropriability
mechanisms (column 4 in Table 4). Fig. 5 depicts this relation-
ship: the importance of innovation collaboration peaks around the
mean importance of contractual appropriability mechanisms. Our
results suggest that the importance of innovation collaboration
rises initially with the importance of contractual appropriability
mechanisms, but declines when ﬁrms’ emphasis on contractual
appropriability mechanisms exceeds the mean value. Thus, high
levels of emphasis on contractual appropriability mechanisms are
associated with a decreasing importance of innovation collabora-
tion with partner organisations other than clients. We  treat this
ﬁnding with caution, however. Although we obtain a signiﬁcant
negative coefﬁcient for the importance of contractual appropriabil-
ity mechanisms squared, the inclusion of the squared terms does
not improve signiﬁcantly the overall ﬁt of our model to the data in
the regression of collaboration with all other partners (see F-test
for the change in R-squared).
Fourth, we  ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive coefﬁcient for the squared
term of the importance of strategic appropriability mechanisms in
the regression model where the dependent variable is the impor-
tance of collaboration with clients (column 2 in Table 4). Thus,
innovation collaboration with clients is more important when ﬁrms
place either low or high levels of emphasis on strategic appropri-
ability mechanisms. This U-shaped relation is depicted in Fig. 6.
Again, however, this result should be treated with caution due to
the wide 90% conﬁdence intervals at low and high levels of empha-
sis on strategic appropriability mechanisms.
Finally, our results show that there is a signiﬁcant positive asso-
ciation between higher R&D investments and the importance of
innovation collaboration with other external partners (suppliers,
competitors, consultants, commercial labs, or private R&D insti-
tutes, universities and government or public research institutes).
This ﬁnding is in line with the existing literature (e.g., Laursen
and Salter, 2014; Mina et al., 2014), and therefore increases our
conﬁdence in the survey results.
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Fig. 3. Association between predicted importance of innovation collaboration with all other partners and emphasis on formal appropriability mechanisms.
Note: (1) Grey area indicates 90% conﬁdence intervals. (2) The group ‘all other partners’ includes suppliers, competitors, consultants, commercial labs, or private R&D
institutes, universities, and government or public research institutes.
Fig. 4. Association between predicted importance of innovation collaboration with clients and emphasis on formal appropriability mechanisms.
Note:  Grey area indicates 90% conﬁdence intervals.
5. Discussion and conclusions
Our study contributes to the understanding of the relation
between collaboration for innovation and appropriability strat-
egy for knowledge-intensive business services ﬁrms in several
ways. First, our ﬁndings uncover a “paradox of formal appropri-
ability mechanisms” in the case of KIBS ﬁrms. On the one hand,
both the existing literature and our own  sample ﬁrms show that
KIBS ﬁrms do not regard formal appropriability mechanisms as
the most effective methods for protecting their innovations from
copying or imitation by competitors, or for otherwise capturing
value from their innovation (Andersen and Howells, 2000; Hipp,
2008; Samuelson, 2010). On the other hand, however, our research
reveals a positive association between the importance of formal
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Fig. 5. Association between predicted importance of innovation collaboration with all other partners and emphasis on contractual appropriability mechanisms.
Note:  (1) Grey area indicates 90% conﬁdence intervals. (2) The group ‘all other partners’ includes suppliers, competitors, consultants, commercial labs, or private R&D
institutes, universities, and government or public research institutes.
Fig. 6. Association between predicted importance of innovation collaboration with clients and emphasis on strategic appropriability mechanisms.
Note:  Grey area indicates 90% conﬁdence intervals.
appropriability mechanisms and that of innovation collaboration
by KIBS ﬁrms. This suggests that for KIBS ﬁrms, for which joint
knowledge creation and transfer, especially with clients, is the
norm (Bettencourt et al., 2002; den Hertog, 2000), the use of formal
appropriability mechanisms can facilitate knowledge exchange, by
providing a clear framework for what is shared and what is private
knowledge.
Second, our research builds on earlier work showing the exis-
tence of a concave relation between innovation collaboration and
importance of appropriability strategies for manufacturing ﬁrms
(Laursen and Salter, 2014), and extends this for KIBS ﬁrms. We  ﬁnd
that the importance of innovation collaboration with clients goes
hand-in-hand with the importance of formal appropriability mech-
anisms, although a negative relation appears when ﬁrms assign
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very high importance to formal appropriability mechanisms. Col-
laboration for innovation with clients is crucial both at the early
stage of the creation of innovation (Love et al., 2011) and at the
ﬁnal stage of project implementation (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Lehrer
et al., 2013). It may  be the case that modest levels of emphasis
on formal appropriability mechanisms may  prevent conﬂicts over
ownership of co-produced knowledge assets and knowledge leak-
ages (or even provide signals for potential partners).
Our results are also consistent with the view that very high
levels of emphasis on these mechanisms can act as a barrier to
important knowledge exchanges (especially regarding partly tacit
knowledge) at the stages of the project deﬁnition and implemen-
tation required for the development of innovation by KIBS ﬁrms
in the course of speciﬁc projects with clients. For example, tight
control of knowledge assets through strict rules by legal depart-
ments, intended to ensure the patentability of future inventions,
can limit incentives to exchange and transfer knowledge and co-
develop innovations by either KIBS ﬁrms or their clients (Alexy
et al., 2009; Leiponen, 2008). It must be acknowledged that an alter-
native interpretation for the U-shaped association uncovered may
be some heterogeneity in ﬁrm behaviour between leading innova-
tors and followers (Arora et al., 2016). The explanation would be
that leading innovators may  be more likely to stress formal appro-
priability mechanisms in order to prevent knowledge leakages, but
may not value strongly innovation collaboration. Further empiri-
cal investigation, however, indicated that this is unlikely to be the
dominant explanation driving the negative part of the estimated
association for our sample of KIBS ﬁrms.10
This inverted U-shaped relation may  also hold for the relation
between the importance of collaboration for all other partners
and that of contractual appropriability mechanisms. Contractual
appropriability mechanisms are regarded in the literature and by
our own sample ﬁrms as the most important methods of captur-
ing value from innovation for KIBS (Leiponen, 2008; Miles et al.,
2000). When used in modest amounts, contractual appropriability
mechanisms appear to be very effective in the governance and con-
trol of innovation collaboration with external partners (Poppo and
Zenger, 2002). But high levels of emphasis on contractual appro-
priability mechanisms (e.g. by having very restrictive clauses on
exclusivity, excessive secrecy, or barriers to labour mobility, such
as non-compete clauses) may  be associated with less willingness
to undertake collaboration with external partners for innovation,
or act as a barrier to knowledge creation and transfer. Exces-
sive secrecy, complex conﬁdentiality agreements (difﬁcult due to
the intangibility of the service) and contracts limiting mobility of
employees to competitors for a long period after they leave the
company, may  create suspicion and erect barriers to collabora-
tion with external organisations, such as competitors or research
organisations (which could conceivably “poach” those valuable
high-skilled professional employees).
Third, our research sheds light on the importance for innovation
collaboration by KIBS ﬁrms of formal, contractual and strate-
gic appropriability mechanisms. Besides the inverted U-shaped
10 Our regression results (column 2 in Table 4) show that the number of inno-
vations introduced by ﬁrms is positively associated with ﬁrms’ perception of the
importance of innovation collaboration with clients (the coefﬁcient is about 0.005
if  we report the estimate up to 3 digits). Furthermore, we repeated the regression
(using column 2 speciﬁcation in Table 4) adding an extra control variable ‘percentage
of  last year’s income from innovation’  as an additional proxy for innovation leadership.
The  regression results (not reported here) were in line with the existing ﬁndings,
i.e.,  inverted U-shaped association between importance of innovation collaboration
with clients and the importance of formal appropriability mechanisms). We also
obtain a positive and statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient (p < 0.1) for the added vari-
able.  The results suggest a positive association between KIBS ﬁrms’ innovativeness
and the importance assigned to collaboration with clients for innovation.
relations described above, we  also ﬁnd that innovation collabora-
tion with clients is more important when strategic appropriability
mechanisms are either of low or high importance. The ﬁnding that
achieving a favourable position in terms of specialised complemen-
tary assets, lead-time advantages and service design complexity
may  facilitate collaboration with clients to co-produce new service
offerings is well documented in the literature (Desyllas and Sako,
2013; Teece, 1986). Nevertheless, the ﬁnding that a low emphasis
on strategic appropriability mechanisms is associated with placing
high importance on collaboration with clients requires explanation.
It is possible that there may  be interaction effects, which could be
explored in further research. It may  be the case that, when the for-
mal  appropriability regime is relatively strong, innovators may  be
able to rely less heavily on strategic appropriability mechanisms.
The ﬁnding of the relation between higher R&D investments and
high importance of innovation collaboration with external part-
ners may  be interpreted in terms of the concept of absorptive
capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Firms that are more active
in R&D may  be more capable of translating external knowledge
into internal capabilities, more knowledgeable about how to man-
age inter-organisational collaboration for innovation, and better
positioned to develop a more adequate appropriability strategy.
Thus, our theoretical and empirical contributions suggest that
innovation features that are “heightened” in KIBS ﬁrms, including
the continuous transfer of knowledge in collaboration with other
organisations (especially clients) and the reliance on highly-skilled
graduates, has to be accompanied by a careful strategy for protect-
ing the ﬁrm’s knowledge. Our study demonstrates the importance
of formal, contractual and strategic appropriablity in the context
of innovation collaboration for KIBS ﬁrms. It also may  suggest that
very high levels of emphasis on such mechanisms can undermine
the trust and reciprocity needed in (tacit) knowledge transfer or
complex development in innovation collaboration, or reduce incen-
tives to collaborate. We  conclude that KIBS ﬁrms need to be aware
that the choice of the type of appropriability mechanisms should
take into account the possible implications that such choices may
have on the capacity of the ﬁrm to exchange knowledge and col-
laborate for innovation with different external partners.
The ﬁndings from this study indicate that KIBS ﬁrms’ man-
agers should not overlook the important role of appropriability
mechanisms (including formal mechanisms, such as patents)
when collaborating for innovation, especially with clients. Admit-
tedly, the study set out to explore associations (and not causal
relationships) between appropriability strategy and innovation col-
laboration. Nevertheless, a possible interpretation of our ﬁndings
is that managers should account for the importance of collabora-
tive relationships (and with different partners) for the success of
an innovative project; and that this criterion should be an integral
part of the ﬁrm’s intellectual property strategy and management.
Our ﬁndings also have implications regarding the development
of a deeper understanding of innovation in services. Some KIBS
ﬁrms play central roles in innovation processes throughout the
economy, as sources of innovations, agents of transfer and diffu-
sion of knowledge, or innovation support for other sectors. Our
results pave the way for a better understanding of both inter-
organisational collaboration for innovation and the role of the
functioning of the intellectual property rights system for KIBS ﬁrms.
Finally, the results contribute to the understanding of ﬁrm
appropriability strategy and innovation collaboration, especially in
sectors where formal appropriability mechanisms (such as patents)
are regarded as playing a less important role in capturing rents from
innovation. The results also offer new insights on the choices of
appropriability mechanisms and innovation collaboration in sec-
tors where tacit knowledge exchanges, especially with clients, are
very frequent and important for innovation. This is ever more
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signiﬁcant, as manufacturing ﬁrms shift from selling products to
selling product-service systems (Neely, 2008).
6. Limitations and future research
As with all empirical research, this study is subject to limitations,
and these should be acknowledged. Our dependent and indepen-
dent variables focus on the perceived importance of organisational
actions, processes and practices; we implicitly assume that this
is associated with actual organisational practices and behaviour.
There is some evidence of broad consistency between our sample
ﬁrms’ perceived importance of patents as means of value capture
from innovation and their actual patenting activity. But the possi-
bility that the proxies only measure perceptions and mental models
of the interviewees of our sample ﬁrms, as opposed to reﬂecting the
ﬁrms’ actual behaviour, should be acknowledged.
In addition, ﬁrms that did not introduce any innovation between
2009 and 2011 are excluded from the analysis. Thus, the paper
addresses the relationship between appropriability mechanisms
and innovation collaboration only for ﬁrms that have introduced
innovations. We  acknowledge, however, that some ﬁrms might
collaborate with external partners and use the various appropri-
ability mechanisms for the governance of the relationship but fail
to introduce innovations. We  can not comment on the role that
appropriability mechanisms play in such a relationship.
Further research, using different indicators and set in differ-
ent empirical contexts, is needed to strengthen conﬁdence in, and
deepen our ﬁndings. For instance, the role played by appropri-
ability mechanisms in innovation collaboration when ﬁrms fail
to introduce innovations could be explored. Another possibility
is to explore whether KIBS leaders and followers have different
behaviour in terms of appropriability mechanisms and collabora-
tion for innovation (see Arora et al., 2016).
Moreover, future research needs to analyse further the under-
lying mechanisms that explain the distinctive patterns of ﬁrms’
appropriability strategies and innovation collaboration that this
study has uncovered. This is likely to require in-depth studies of
the ways in which ﬁrms make the strategic choices that we have
begun to unveil. Further studies could uncover in more detail the
characteristics, strengths and disadvantages of each of the differ-
ent types of appropriability mechanisms – formal, contractual and
strategic – in the context of KIBS ﬁrms when collaborating with
clients and other external partners.
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Appendix A.
Table A1
Assessing non-response bias using the characteristic comparison method.
Non-respondents Respondents Total
Count
(Column percentage)
Count
(Column percentage)
Count
(Column percentage)
CHI-SQUARE TEST FOR INDEPENDENCE
Country
UK 314
(15.13%)
92
(41.26%)
406
(17.67%)
US 1761
(84.87%)
131
(58.74%)
1892
(82.33%)
Total 2075
(100%)
223
(100%)
2298
(100%)
Pearson chi2(1) = 94.466; p = 0.000
Industrial sector (2-digit SIC code)
48 118
(5.69%)
12
(5.38%)
130
(5.66%)
60 547
(26.36%)
45
(20.18%)
592
(25.76%)
62 136
(6.55%)
15
(6.73%)
151
(6.57%)
63 110
(5.30%)
11
(4.93%)
121
(5.27%)
67 264
(12.72%)
21
(9.42%)
285
(12.40%)
73 618
(29.78%)
85
(38.12%)
703
(30.59%)
87 159
(7.66%)
22
(9.87%)
181
(7.88%)
Others 123
(6.00%)
12
(5.38%)
135
(5.87%)
Total 2075
(100%)
223
(100%)
2298
(100%)
Pearson chi2(7) = 10.770; p = 0.149
MEANS TEST COMPARISON
Firm size (the number of employees)
Observations 2075 223
Mean 3897.15 11968.21
SE  448.62 3735.29
t(2296) = −4.3982; p = 0.000
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Table A2
Number of granted patents per ﬁrm by “perceived patent signiﬁcance” class.
Perceived signiﬁcance of patents for value capture [1–5]
All sample US ﬁrms [1–2) [2–3) [3–4) [4–5]
Firm number 88 33 10 22 23
Mean  patent number 37.6 0.1 1.1 20.1 124.0
St.dev. patent number 217.8 0.7 2.6 85.2 412.0
Notes: patents granted to sample US ﬁrms during the period 2007–2011 were collected from Derwent patent database.
Appendix B. : Survey data quality
An implicit assumption inherent in our empirical measures of
the variables is that the perceived importance of organisational
actions, processes and practices reﬂects, lead to, or at least are
associated with, actual organisational practices and behaviour.
However, one should acknowledge the possibility that our proxies
only measure perceptions and mental models by the interviewees
of our sampled ﬁrms as opposed to actual behaviour. In order to get
a sense of the possible differences between perceptions and actions,
we carried out a more detailed analysis of patenting behaviour in
ﬁrms. For this purpose, we collected information from the Derwent
patent database on the actual number of patents granted to our
sample US ﬁrms during the period 2007–2011 and compared it with
their recorded scores of perceived signiﬁcance of patents as value
appropriation mechanisms. As can be seen from Table A2, the aver-
age number of patent grants is indeed monotonically increasing
with the recorded score of perceived patent signiﬁcance, although
there is considerable variation in patent numbers across ﬁrms
within groups. Of course, one should not expect a one-to-one cor-
respondence between the reported patent signiﬁcance score and
the recorded number of patents, since a small number of patents
may  have been critical to the capturing of returns from innovation.
So at least in the case of patenting, there seems to be a fair degree
of consistency between perceived importance and actual reliance
on patents. Furthermore, to assess common method bias arising
from self-reported measures, we applied Harman’s (1967) one fac-
tor test. Un-rotated factor analysis of variables that are used in the
analysis resulted in 12 factors with an eigenvalue greater than 1,
thus common method bias can be regarded as insigniﬁcant in this
study (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986).
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